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Despite the fact that Argentina has been suﬀering from
recession for years the timing and severity of the recent cur-
rency crisis has surprised most observers. This paper an-
alyzes whether the “early warning” or “signals” approach
of Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998)
and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999) could have predicted the
Argentinean currency crisis at an earlier point in time. Us-
ing a broad set of indicators, it is shown that the forecast-
ing quality of this approach was poor in the case of Ar-
gentina. (81 words)
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11 Introduction
In economics as in medicine, prevention combined with early de-
tection of emerging problems comprises the better part of the cure.
In the case of economic crises, the question is whether these abnor-
malities can be detected soon enough to allow preemptive political
measures.
One of the lastest patients suﬀering from a far reaching cur-
rency crisis is Argentina. The collapse of the Argentinean peso in
2002 was followed by a deep economic recession, which then began
to spread within Latin America. The new Argentinean crisis re-
vived old debates about potential causes, symptoms and patterns
of currency crises.
In general, economic theory proposes at least three answers to
the question of how currency crises emerge. According to “ﬁrst
generation models” (Krugman (1979)) currency crises come about
due to a run on the international reserves, as speculators under-
stand that ﬁscal and monetary policy is inconsistent with the cho-
sen pegged exchange rate. Thus, these models explain speculative
attacks against a currency as a consequence of unsustainable de-
velopments in the “fundamentals” of an economy - such as rapidly
growing budget deﬁcits, high inﬂation, large and growing current
account deﬁcits, etc.
The “second generation models” of currency crises (Obstfeld
(1986, 1996)) focus on expectations rather than on fundamentals
and their developments. Unlike the ﬁrst generation models, even
2if fundamentals are not particularly unfavorable, a speculative at-
tack may occur. The behavior of the domestic interest rate re-
ﬂects the probability of a crisis. Since defending the exchange rate
against an attack requires the authorities to raise interest rates rel-
ative to world levels, maintaining the ﬁxed peg becomes costly for
the policymakers. Thus, crises can be purely self-fulﬁlling events.
After the Asian crisis in 1997, a new generation of theoreti-
cal explanations evolved, linking currency crisis and ﬁnancial sec-
tor fragility (Krugman (1998a,b), (1999) and Aghion, Bacchetta,
Banerjee (2001)).1 These models point out the role of ﬁnancial
intermediaries and asset prices concerning the emergence of a cur-
rency crisis.
In the case of the Argentinean crisis there is no consensus about
the reasons for the emergence of the currency crisis- apart from
the well-known and long-lasting foreign debt situation. According
to Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002), the capital ﬂow retrench-
ment after the Russian crisis of 1998 created a major real ex-
change rate misalignment and ﬁscal diﬃculties in Argentina. De
la Torre, Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (2002) ﬁnd that Argentina
fell into a growth-debt trap after 1998. When economic activity
did not increase and credit from abroad dried up, the crisis be-
came unavoidable. Feldstein (2002) argues that the crisis was due
to exchange rate overvaluation and to an extremely high amount of
foreign debt. While we ﬁnd numerous arguments for the potential
emergence of a currency crisis in Argentina ex post, the concrete
3timing of the Argentinean crisis was not predicted. It remains an
open question whether the standard indicators gave hints for the
evolution and timing of the currency crisis during the pre-crisis
period.
To provide a substantial judgement concerning the usefulness
of early warning indicators, our paper analyzes the economic de-
velopment in Argentina between 1992 and 2002. We use the
“early warning approach” developed by Kaminsky (1998), Kamin-
sky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999). To
our knowledge, an application of this analytical framework on Ar-
gentina does not exist at present. The “early-warning” system
itself is based on “leading indicators” which are expected to send
“signals” prior to a crisis. We show that in the case of Argentina
these early warning indicators were widely misleading. Signals
- if any - were sent very late. They came too late, for a crisis
prevention, as eﬀects of policy measures need time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents some stylized facts concerning the economic develop-
ment in Argentina. In section 3, the signals approach devel-
oped by Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998)
and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999) is brieﬂy explained. Section 4 is a
presentation of the ﬁndings obtained by using this methodology to
explain the Argentinean crisis. Finally, section 5 concludes with a
critical summary of the results.
42 Stylized facts - What went wrong in
Argentina?
In January 2002 the Argentinean currency board, which had started
with overwhelming economic success (reﬂected in low inﬂation and
high growth rates), came to a sudden, harsh and dramatic end.
The time of a 1:1 peg between the US-dollar and the Argentinean
peso was over and the peso depreciated dramatically.
The major aim of a currency board is to import price stabil-
ity - in the case of Argentina from the USA. The introduction of
such a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is expected to make foreign in-
vestment more attractive and thus promote growth. However, the
introduction of a currency board leads to the total abandonment
of sovereign domestic monetary policy. Consequently, if such an
exchange rate regime is to be sustainable, it requires not only the
convergence of inﬂation rates between the developing country and
the anchor-currency country, but also major institutional adjust-
ments, especially within the ﬁnancial sector. It also requires a
strong ﬁscal discipline.
Indeed, after the introduction of the currency board in Ar-
gentina, growth rates increased tremendously; for the years 1991-
1998 the gross domestic product increased on average around 5.8
percent (ﬁgure 1). Thus, Argentina outperformed most other
countries in the region in terms of per capita growth until 1998.
During the same period, inﬂation went down and remained be-
5low one percent (ﬁgure 2). Furthermore, inﬂation in Argentina
dropped below US rates; in real terms the Argentinean peso started
to depreciate against the US-dollar (ﬁgure 3). Foreign direct in-
vestment into the Argentinean economy also increased enormously.
However, a certain crowding out eﬀect was observed against do-
mestic investment activities: the investment ratio (around 19 per-
cent) remained relatively stable over time.
The current account balance was negative during the whole
period under consideration (ﬁgure 4). However, in comparison to
other emerging economies its share of GDP remained low. Mea-
sured by traditional indicators, such as the share of exports to
GDP, Argentina continued to be a relatively closed economy. While
Argentina’s exports where relatively low, the external debt was
huge (ﬁgure 5). The ﬁrst years of the currency board were accom-
panied by a relatively low budget deﬁcit (ﬁgure 6).
Insert Figure 1 to 6 about here
The initial macroeconomic diﬃculties occurred in the after-
math of the Mexican crisis of December 1994, but the Argentinean
economy recovered relatively quickly; in 1996 positive growth rates
were reported again.2 After the Asian (1997) and Russian (1998)
crises and the devaluation of the Brazilian real (1999) however, the
Argentinean strategy for growth became more and more costly.
Argentina was drawn into the swirls of the changing climate on
the international ﬁnancial markets. Argentinean policy makers
faced a dilemma: an increase in interest rates was necessary to
6make the country attractive for international investors. However,
higher domestic interest rates lead to a proﬁt squeeze and make
any economic recovery more unlikely. Additionally, the apprecia-
tion of the US-dollar made the chosen exchange rate policy even
more challenging, since Argentina began to lose competitiveness
vis-´ a-vis its principal trade partners.
From 1999 onwards GDP decreased continually. But even
though the economic weakness became more and more evident,
many of the typical pre-currency crisis symptoms did not occur.
Usually one of the main indicators of a currency crisis is a sizable
current account deﬁcit. The current account deﬁcit in Argentina,
in contrast, decreased since 1999. Furthermore, Argentina was suf-
fering from deﬂation and the peso was depreciating in real terms
against the US dollar. However, international debt measured in
percent of exports remained very high (around 500 percent); pos-
sibly indicating the economy’s vulnerability. In such an unclear
setting, where some important crisis indicators might show the
danger of the emergence of a currency crisis, but others don’t,
analytical approaches to evaluate the current situation are impor-
tant.
3 The Signals Approach
In this section, the ”signals” approach developed by Kaminsky
(1998), Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky/Reinhart
7(1999) is described. They propose a speciﬁc early warning system
for predicting currency crises. This warning system involves a
range of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial indicators that tend to ex-
hibit an anomalous behavior in the periods preceding a currency
crisis. Every time that an indicator deviates from its “normal”
level beyond a determined critical threshold value, it is interpreted
as issuing a warning signal about a possible currency crisis within
the crisis window. This crisis window is set at 24 months, which
means that within this period the indicators should be able to
anticipate crises. Before describing the signals approach further,
some terms have to be deﬁned.
Identifying Crises
A currency crisis is deﬁned as a situation in which a currency
gets under enormous pressure, leading either to a sharp deprecia-
tion and/or to a strong drop in international reserves. According
to the existing literature, an “exchange market pressure index”
is constructed, to identify currency crises. This index is usually
calculated as a weighted average of monthly changes in exchange
rates and international reserves.3 Crises are then said to occur
when the pressure index reaches “extreme” values. However, a
major drawback of this approach is that the weights, as well as
the threshold value used to identify the speculative attack, are
somewhat arbitrary. To demonstrate, Kaminsky et. al. (1998)
deﬁne crises as periods in which the exchange market pressure in-
8dex is at least three standard deviations above the mean, while
in Edison (2000), a crisis is called as soon as the index is above
its mean by more than 2.5 standard deviations. However, the
advantage of constructing this index is that both successful and
unsuccessful attacks on a currency can be detected.
Choice of indicator variables
In their studies, Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart
(1998) and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999) use the following variables
as leading indicators:
² Capital account indicators: international reserves, ratio of
broad money to gross international reserves, real interest dif-
ferential, real interest rate of the USA, foreign debt, capital
ﬂight, short-term foreign debt.
² Current account indicators: exports, imports, terms of trade,
real exchange rate.
² Financial sector indicators: stock of commercial bank de-
posits, ratio of domestic credit to GDP, money multiplier of
M2, excess real M1 balances.
² Real sector indicators: an index of output, domestic real
interest rate, ratio of lending to deposit rate, an index of
equity prices.
Most of the variables (with the exception of interest rates, the “ex-
cess” of real M1 balances and the real exchange rate) are twelve-
9month growth rates. 4
Threshold values
An indicator is interpreted as issuing a warning signal whenever
it deviates from its “normal” level beyond a determined critical
threshold value. The threshold values are set so as to maximize
the signaling performance of each indicator. Thus, noise to signal
ratios, deﬁned as the ratio of bad signals to good signals, are es-
timated for a range of potential threshold values. “Bad” signals
are those not followed by a crisis within the crisis window, while a
signal followed by crisis is called a “good” signal. The value that
minimizes the ratio of bad to good signals becomes the threshold
chosen for that variable. However, it should be noted that the
thresholds are deﬁned in relation to percentiles of the frequency
distribution of each indicator.
The signals of the leading indicators
After having determined the optimal thresholds, the fragility of the
economy can be analyzed by combining the information provided
by all indicators. First of all, Kaminsky (1998) calculates the
“index of fragility”. This index is calculated for each month by
counting the number of indicators having crossed the threshold
value in that month or in the eight preceding months.
Naturally, a desirable feature of the index of fragility is that the
number of signals does not increase only in the months immedi-
10ately preceding the crisis, as in that case an anomalous behavior
of the indicators could not be detected suﬃciently in advance to
allow preemptive measures. Thus, the evolution of the index of
fragility as the country approaches a crisis is examined.
However, by only counting the number of signals being issued,
important information about the country’s fragility may be lost.
Therefore the following composite indicators, described in Kamin-
sky (1998), should be considered.5
The ﬁrst of these indicators gives an idea about the strength of the
signals. Signals are therefore classiﬁed into extreme and normal
signals. In order to distinguish between them, a second threshold
must be introduced. If an indicator crosses this second threshold,
it is considered as issuing an extreme signal. The second threshold
is deﬁned as the half of the percentile of the frequency distribution,
which corresponds to the ﬁrst threshold. To demonstrate, if the
critical region of the rate of growth of exports is 10 percent, it
will be regarded as issuing an extrem signal when it lies in the 5th
percentile of the distribution. Whereas it will be considered as
issuing a mild signal when it falls in the interval between the 5th
and the 10th percentile of the distribution.6 The extreme signals
enter into the ﬁrst composite indicator double weighted and the











A second composite indicator considers the ongoing deterioration











t¡8;t is one if the variable j crosses the threshold value in t
or in the previous eight periods, and zero otherwise.
The third composite indicator considers the diﬀerent forecasting
accuracy of each variable and weights signals more heavily when
issued by indicators that already proved to have more reliable
forecasting performance. In particular, the weights are given by
the inverse noise-to-signal ratio. Thus, this composite indicator
is deﬁned as the sum of “weighted” signals being issued by each












t is one if the variable j crosses the threshold value in
t and zero otherwise and ±j is the noise to signal ratio of the
indicator j.
After having constructed theses composite indicators, it is possi-
ble to calculate the conditional probabilities of a crisis. Following
Kaminsky (1998) and Edison (2000) these probabilities are calcu-
lated as follows:
P(crisist;t+24j;Il · It < Iu) =
P
MC with Il · It < Iu
P
M with Il · It < Iu
where P is the probability, M stands for months and MC for
months wich are followed by a crisis within 24 months. Crisist;t+24
12is the occurrence of a crisis within 24 months, given that the com-
posite indicator It falls within the upper (Iu) and the lower (Il)
boundary.
4 Empirical results
In the following, we present empirical results obtained by using the
signals approach just described for analyzing Argentina’s vulnera-
bility. The period under consideration runs from January 1992 to
January 2002.7 With the exception of the data for external debt,
which are provided by the Ministry of Finance, all data are taken
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Monthly
data are employed.
Our ﬁrst step is to identify crises during this period. For this pur-
pose, we construct an index of exchange market pressure (EMP)
as a weighted average of monthly exchange rate changes (∆e) and
international reserve changes (∆R):
EMP ´ ´(∆e) ¡ Ã(∆R) (4)
with ´ and Ã as weights.8 Crises are then said to occur when the
pressure index is at least 2 standard deviations above its mean.9
Using this index, only one crisis is identiﬁed: In January 2002 the
pressure on the exchange rate became extremely high. Indeed, in
January 2002 the currency board had to be abandoned and within
a few days the Argentinean peso lost much of its value. Argentina
was confronted with a far-reaching currency crisis.10
13Could the indicators used by Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky/ Li-
zondo/ Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999) have de-
tected this currency crisis at its outset? To answer this question,
we ﬁrst construct the set of indicators discussed in the previous
chapter. However, due to the lack of data, “excess real M1 bal-
ances”, “capital ﬂight”, “short term foreign debt” , “terms of
trade” and “the index of equity” cannot be considered for Ar-
gentina. The sample period runs from January 1992 to December
2001 - directly before the outbreak of the currency crisis. The fre-
quency of the data is monthly.11 According to Kaminsky (1998),
Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999),
the ”crisis window” is set at 24 months.
Finally, the threshold values for the indicators have to be de-
ﬁned. We took these threshold values from Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1999) and applied them to the distribution of the Argen-
tinean indicators. Thus, if the optimal threshold for the rate of
growth of exports is given as the 10th percentile in Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999), we have to determine the value of exports at the
10th percentile of its distribution for Argentina.
Did the indicators send any signals during the Argentinean pre-
crisis period? If so, when did they start to send these signals?
Was it early enough to prevent the emergence of a currency crisis
by policy measures? Considering the 24 month crisis window,
we see that two years prior to the crisis only one indicator was
sending a warning signal: the output indicator. Hence, this time
14can be considered as relatively tranquil. Eight months prior to
the crisis, the picture looks only slightly diﬀerent. At that time,
ﬁve out of 14 signals were sending warning signals: the ratio of
M2 to reserves, the reserves, the ratio of lending to deposit rate,
the Argentinean real interest rate on deposits and the real interest
diﬀerential between the Argentinean and the US-American interest
rate. The output indicator had stopped sending signals. However,
in the case of Argentina, history has shown that periods in which
ﬁve of the given indicators were sending signals did not necessarily
lead to a currency crisis. Even during tranquil times, there have
been periods in which ﬁve indicators were sending signals.
It was only four months prior to the crisis when the number of sig-
nals increased dramatically. Nevertheless, it is extremely diﬃcult
to prevent currency crises within such a short period, as it takes
time to put policy decisions into eﬀect. To our surprise, in the
month immediately before the crisis, the number of signals being
issued actually decreased. Hence, the forecasting quality of this
simple signal approach seems to be relatively low in the case of
Argentina.
Calculating the “index of fragility” as Kaminsky (1998) has done
leads to nearly the same result. Figure 8 shows the distribution
of this index in times of crisis and in tranquil times. The mean
number of signals being issued during the Argentinean pre-crisis
period is only 23 percent higher than the mean number of signals
in tranquil times. This ﬁnding is in contrast to the results pre-
15sented by Kaminsky (1998), who analyzed a set of crisis countries
and showed that the number of indicators sending signals during
pre-crisis times is 70 percent higher than in non-crisis periods.
Furthermore, the evolution of the index of fragility is illustrated
in Figure 9. The number of signals decreases during the whole
year 2000, suggesting a relaxation in the economic environment.
Thus, the index of fragility does not appear to be a particularly
good indicator for the Argentinean crisis.
Insert Figure 8 to 9 about here
In order to obtain more reliable information concerning the vul-
nerability of the Argentinean economy, the next step is to calculate
the composite indicators. The ﬁrst composite indicator makes it
possible to take into account the severity of signals being issued
by individual indicators (see Figure 10). However, at a glance,
this indicator does not provide substantial information since the
number of indicators sending signals increased only a few months
prior to the crisis . Even more surprisingly, the indicators did not
send more signals than in tranquil times, seven months before the
crisis erupted. Again the trend of the indicator is not clear; only
one month prior to the crisis, the indicator sends less signals than
before.
The performance of the second composite indicator is even worse,
as this indicator takes the highest values during non-crisis times
(see Figure 11). According to this indicator, a crisis in Argentina
was to be expected between 1995 and 1996. Like the other compos-
16ite indicator, the second composite indicator starts sending more
signals only a few months before the crisis.
Figure 12 shows the evolution of the third composite indicator.
While it reﬂects the beginning of a potential crisis slightly earlier
than the indicators mentioned above, it also begins to decrease
only one month before the currency board had to be abandoned.
Insert Figure 10 to 12 about here
Using the composite indicators, it is possible to calculate the con-
ditional probabilities of a currency crisis. Table 1 reports these
probabilities associated with diﬀerent values of the composite in-
dicators. It should be noted that for a certain range of values there
is an inverse relationship between the value of the composite indi-
cators and the conditional probabilities. Only for a small range of
values do the composite indicators suggest a rising probability of
crisis as the indicator increases. It is particulary strange that in
the case of the ﬁrst composite indicator, the second highest con-
ditional probability of a crisis is the one with the indicator taking
the value zero. While in the case of the second composite indicator
the probability of a crisis is the lowest one for this indicator tak-
ing the value 8 or higher. A possible explanation for this ﬁnding
is that, as already mentioned, the indicators often issued signals
without being followed by crises.
In summary, the fragility index as well as the diﬀerent composite
indicators do not appropriately reﬂect the tensions within the Ar-
gentinean economic system. The indicators started to send their
17signals very late - too late to make a successful policy intervention
possible. Furthermore, during the immediate pre-crisis period the
power of explanation even decreased; the trend of many indica-
tors is unclear and the development of the composite indicators
in particular could be interpreted as the beginning of a relax-
ing process. Consequently, concerning the Argentinean crisis of
2002, Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and
Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999) indicators seem to be misleading on
the whole.
5 Conclusions
After the emergence of the Argentinean currency crisis (2002) a
magnitude of questions opened up. When did the ambitious cur-
rency board start to become unreliable? What was the initial
spark that set oﬀ the crisis? Was there nothing that could have
been done to prevent this disaster? What message were standard
economic indicators giving during the pre-crisis period?
This paper analyzed the pre-crisis period in Argentina employ-
ing the “early warning system” developed by Kaminsky (1998),
Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999).
We found that this early warning system, which is based on a
broad set of indicators, did not give enough indications for the
emergence of a currency crisis. Neither the diﬀerent indicators
nor the fragility index was able to predict a currency crisis in the
18given 24 month crisis window. Furthermore, some indicators even
sent misleading information, especially during the immediate pre-
crisis period. In addition, warning signals were sent very late - too
late for any suﬃcient policy intervention.
Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and Kamin-
sky/Reinhart (1999) have shown that their indicators operated
suﬃciently in the case of many currency crises in many emerging
economies. Why is Argentina diﬀerent? To answer this question,
further research is necessary. This should focus at least on two
issues: First, expectations might have played a major role in the
case of Argentina. Since the early warning system approach does
not explicitly consider changes in expectations, the explanatory
power of other methods might be more helpful. Second, other
than macroeconomic factors, e.g. political turbulence and corrup-
tion, might be important to explain the crisis in Argentina.
19Notes
1In view of these models, “banking crises” are related to currency crises
via a fragile ﬁnancial sector within which both types of crises occur.
2In 1995 the authorities recognized the importance of a particularly re-
silient ﬁnancial system and banking system reforms were introduced quickly.
3Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) also include the interest rate in
the index of exchange market pressure, since the government can also boost
the interest rate to defend the currency.
4In our study we apply this set of indicators with the exception of “excess
real M1 balances”, “capital ﬂight”, “short term foreign debt”, “terms of trade”
and “the index of equity”. This is due to the lack of data.
5Composite indicators have been constructed in various studies, including
Kaminsky (1998), Edison (2000) and Br¨ uggeman and Linne(2002).
6If the critical region of the rate of growth of imports is 10 percent, the
ﬁrst indicator will be regarded as issuing an extrem signal when it lies in the
95th percentile of distribution, while it will be considered as issuing a mild
signal when it falls in the interval between the 90th and the 95th percentile
of the distribution.
7However, for a few indicators the period under consideration starts some
months later. This is due to problems of data availability, but does not touch
our results.
8The weights are calculated as the inverse of the series’ standard deviation
in the past.
9We examined whether or not the results change if crises are deﬁned as
periods in which the index is at least 2.5 or 3 standard deviations above the
mean. The results remain the same, however.
10To obtain an understanding of how the speculative pressure index works,
see Figure 7, which displays this index for Argentina.
11Monthly rates for external debt and GDP are generated by interpolation
from quarterly data. The variables (with the exception of interest rates and
20the real exchange rate) are 12-month growth rates.
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